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ENABLING SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION
WITH FPGAS IN THE DATACENTER
PIERRE-FRANÇOIS W. WOLFE
ABSTRACT
Big data utilizes large amounts of processing resources requiring either greater
efficiency or more selectivity. The collection and managing of such large pools of data
also introduces more opportunities for compromised security and privacy, necessitat-
ing more attentive planning and mitigations. Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a
technique enabling confidential data from multiple sources to be processed securely,
only revealing agreed-upon results. Currently, adoption is limited by the challenge
of basing a complete system on available software libraries. Many libraries require
expertise in cryptography, do not efficiently address the computation overhead of
employing MPC, and leave deployment considerations to the user.
In this work we consider the available MPC protocols, changes in computer hard-
ware, and growth of cloud computing. We propose a cloud-deployed MPC as a Service
(MPCaaS) to help eliminate the barriers to adoption and enable more organizations
and individuals to handle their shared data processing securely. The growing presence
of Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) hardware in datacenters enables acceler-
ated computing as well as low latency, high bandwidth communication that bolsters
the performance of MPC. Developing an abstract service that employs this hardware
will democratize access to MPC, rather than restricting it to the small overlapping
pools of users knowledgeable about both cryptography and hardware accelerators. A
hardware proof of concept we have implemented at BU supports this idea. We de-
ployed an efficient three-party Secret Sharing (SS) protocol supporting both Boolean
vii
and arithmetic shares on FPGA hardware. We compare our hardware design to the
original authors’ software implementations of Secret Sharing and to research results
accelerating MPC protocols based on Garbled Circuits with FPGAs. Our conclusion
is that Secret Sharing in the datacenter is competitive and, when implemented on
FPGA hardware, is able to use at least 10× fewer computer resources than the orig-
inal work using CPUs. Finally, we describe the ongoing work and envision research
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Many rapid changes are taking place at all levels of computing. This includes a
continuous growth in the quantity of data that is collected from the environment,
systems, and individuals. The ideal of fungible computing resources, greater effi-
ciency, and convenience offered by Cloud Computing has resulted in the growth of
data centers which cluster compute. Hardware progress has moved beyond the pre-
dictable performance gains achieved while Moore’s Law and Dennard Scaling held
true. Subsequently, there has been a greater focus on parallelization with multiple
processors as well as using specialized silicon in heterogeneous architectures. All the
while, strides have been made in improving the capabilities of communication be-
tween systems. New analytic techniques continue to be developed, and existing ones
are refined and optimized to make better use of the evolving hardware. With all of the
opportunities that come from having more information, connectivity, and processing
innovations, there are also risks. More sensitive information is captured and must
be kept safe at all times. Keeping attackers at bay requires more careful planning
as the highly connected systems that exist present a larger attack surface and more
opportunities for errors to have a severe impact. Security must also provide nuanced
control of valid user access to data, including both processing and viewing it. Only
blocking malicious actors is insufficient and doesn’t provide user need-to-know or data
privacy guarantees which are critical on everything from company IP to individuals’
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PII. Thankfully a wide range of cryptographic tools can be used as part of careful
system design to address these challenges.
1.2 Example Scenarios
Sensitive data is everywhere around us: personal, financial, medical, government, and
more. However, we regularly hear about costly cybersecurity compromises with some
estimates indicating a worldly cost in the trillions (Morgan, 2021). Both companies
and individuals lack confidence when it comes to maintaining the privacy and security
of their data (Brooks, 2021). Industry, governments, and individuals can all greatly
benefit from sharing data and performing joint computations but face risks doing so.
Here are a few illustrative scenarios:
HIPAA compliance in the healthcare industry is a good example. Under certain
circumstances, data held by a “Covered Entity", a healthcare provider, plan, or clear-
inghouse, may be shared without explicit written authorization by patients. These
scenarios include exchanges between entities for specific goals, such as assessing and
improving the effectiveness of treatment protocols, and combating fraud. However,
shareable Protected Health Information (PHI) is strictly limited to only information
that is immediately relevant to the insight sought and that belongs to patients shared
by the entities. Even when permitted under HIPAA, only the minimum amount of
PHI needed to complete a task may be shared. The use of tools that can allow for
operations on encrypted data, revealing only final outputs, would make it easier to
employ data while meeting these directives without fear of over-sharing.
Aside from healthcare, another example is government organizations. These all
have strong data confidentiality requirements and have in many cases been limited to
using private in-house clusters for processing. Alternately, special accommodations
where cloud offerings are separated from the public can sometimes be used but require
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extra effort and overhead. This “walled garden” approach can cause fragmentation
in hardware, slow update cycles, and high costs when compared to more open cloud
offerings. Securing public clouds such that they are acceptable for government use
would ease hardware and software system upgrades, include access to new cloud
services, and provide better performance. There is recognition of the benefits that
the public cloud could offer governments, and some efforts are underway to offer a
streamlined but security-conscious path for adoption. The US Federal Government’s
FedRAMP is one such approach (VanRoekel, 2011). Nonetheless, additional tools
and techniques are always needed.
Unfortunately, the choice that is often made is to either not use or share data
in the interest of keeping it safe or, alternately, to distribute, compute with, or oth-
erwise employ data even though it is at greater risk of compromise. In some cases,
organizations may choose to share data broadly because individuals bear most of the
risk. Consumers are becoming more aware of the collection and dissemination of their
data and are pushing for more control and accountability as seen in the GDPR and
CCPA (Anant et al., 2020). Furthermore, insights about demographics, salaries, or
other sensitive information may also pose a risk to companies, particularly if they
seem to be lagging competitors.
Beyond what has already been mentioned, there are additional risks associated
with data sharing, storage, and processing in the cloud. Potential cloud tenants may
not trust certain providers, data partners, co-located peers, or the network being used
while still desiring to gain the benefits of a curated, highly available, and scalable
environment. We are then left to consider what algorithms and approaches can help
to decouple what appears to be a forced trade-off between processing data and keeping
it safe while also making it possible to use cloud resources with confidence.
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1.3 Motivation & Goals
Thankfully, many options exist for systems to address varying levels of trust and
risk while enabling the safe use of shared data. We propose steps toward a complete
solution for secure cloud environments which maintains data confidentiality while
allowing for joint computation over that protected private data with other co-located
parties in the same data center.
The critical cryptography that enables this is Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
(also known as SFE) which allows parties to securely share confidential data and
compute collective information without ever releasing one’s own personal data. As
defined in pending legislation within the United States Senate, “the term ‘secure multi-
party computation’ means a computerized system that enables different participating
entities in possession of private sets of data to link and aggregate their data sets for
the exclusive purpose of performing a finite number of pre-approved computations
without transferring or otherwise revealing any private data to each other or anyone
else” (Wyden, 2019) In this manner, MPC makes it possible to glean insights from
large, private data repositories. These might otherwise be missed when limited to
smaller pools of publicly-shareable data or could require parties to duplicate efforts
to collect or generate more information.
Cloud usage for confidential data has been a difficult proposition as potential
clients can’t accept the exposure to other denizens or the controlling parties. Public
providers can offer isolated versions of their typical offerings, or organizations can
deploy their own clouds. However, such specialized setups may not compete with the
scale of computational power available in a public system and cost more by limiting
the economies of scales possible in large installations shared between tenants.
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1.4 What’s wrong with MPC?
Given the features of MPC that can address many of the challenges with comput-
ing on data while keeping it secure and private, one is left to question why it is not
currently in wider use. There are several difficulties facing MPC. These include the
inherent computational overhead necessary when protecting information. More re-
silient protocols require more resources though they offer stronger guarantees against
more advanced adversaries. Though algorithmic improvements have made it possi-
ble to conceive of practical implementations of MPC there is still a performance gap
that needs to be narrowed. Beyond computation, communication is another limiting
factor. Generally speaking, MPC approaches that make efficient use of communica-
tion bandwidth experience communication latency in an amplified fashion while those
that don’t suffer from the latency as much are less efficient in their use of bandwidth.
Somewhat cyclically, the systems that require low-latency are discounted because
they suffer from latency when implemented on software and run on CPUs resulting
in more attention going to the less bandwidth efficient approaches. Those have seen
some acceleration efforts but they are still hampered by inefficient use of commu-
nication bandwidth. However, the focus on them continues since acceleration work
already exists. This circular rut needs to be escaped. If a fast, hardware accelerated
MPC implementation, that is relatively easy to use exists, it could bootstrap a posi-
tive cycle of improvements and be more accessible to users. MPC currently requires
at least some level of experience with cryptography. Providing hardware acceleration
can help to make it more viable to use algorithms but if it requires both cryptography
and hardware knowledge, the pool of potential users remains very small.
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1.5 Proposed Solution
This thesis proposes that Secret Sharing algorithms are best suited for Multi-Party
Computation systems built in data center environments. Low-latency communication
available to systems within a data center allows Secret Sharing to be selected instead of
Garbled Circuits. Given the same communication bandwidth between parties, Secret
Sharing maximizes throughput as less data is required for each logical gate processed.
FPGAs are the ideal architecture for MPC parties in this scenario because they avoid
introducing unnecessary latency, support high communication bandwidth, and can
execute custom MPC primitives. Furthermore, they are more efficient than CPUs
or GPUs and more flexible than ASICs. By maximizing throughput, cloud providers
can build practical systems that offer access to MPC to their clients which will ease
and increase adoption.
1.6 Results & Contributions
This thesis demonstrates the performance improvement that can be obtained by op-
erating Secret Sharing protocols by FPGAs in a data center. This research aims
to encourage further work towards making this system a reality, improving access
to MPC by all types of users. The resulting contributions can be distilled into the
following two items:
• Demonstrating the high performance of SS MPC on FPGAs in the data center.
• Providing clear steps to achieve a viable system offering easily usable MPC.
Initial work focused on better understanding the landscape of MPC research and
technologies. This led to an interest in Secret Sharing based algorithms which ap-
peared to offer the best overall throughput among protocols when employed in an
ideal environment. With the main limiting factor being latency, networked devices in
7
close proximity appeared optimal. As FPGAs offer great connectivity, low latency,
and can be tuned to efficiently perform specific computations, they seemed well suited
for the task. In sum, we theorized that we would obtain compelling performance from
linked data center FPGAs running SS MPC and set out to verify this hypothesis.
Next, a particular SS MPC algorithm with a simple design that offered high per-
formance was selected (Araki, Furukawa, et al., 2016). An FPGA proof of concept
was implemented, tested, and the results compared to the software implementation
results from the authors of the original algorithm. We concluded that Secret Sharing
MPC in this type of scenario was competitive with Garbled Circuit MPC implementa-
tions on FPGA and furthermore, that at least an order of magnitude fewer resources
could be used relative to the software on CPU tests performed by the original authors
(Patel et al., 2020; Wolfe et al., 2020).
Subsequent work focused on some of the elements necessary to bringing MPC to
the data center. This primarily took place under the umbrella of a BU Cloud Comput-
ing project course using resources available through the Massachusetts Open Cloud
(MOC) and through CloudLab. Prior to the course, the project mentors had created a
clean MPC implementation in C, which helped to avoid the performance penalties suf-
fered by some other implementations when relying on many dependencies (Liagouris
et al., 2021). Student team members focused on automating deployment to different
cloud platforms and performing a preliminary assessment of the differences between
environments by improving benchmarking and profiling instrumentation (Rehman et
al., 2021). Several Ansible playbooks and detailed documentation were delivered and
are currently being used by the mentors in their research. Greater familiarity with
cloud resources gained through this experience helped when crafting a detailed vision
of the steps necessary to complete a full MPCaaS system.
Work on extending the existing FPGA implementation is ongoing. The long-term
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project plan we developed is composed of three main thrusts. The first is enabling
MPC in a cloud environment such that the hardware and software used properly
provision the resources, isolate the tenants, and make it possible to execute secure
MPC operations. This system should seek to account for vulnerabilities and not
make assumptions suitable only for experiments. The second is to enable transpar-
ent use of FPGAs when MPC operations are called assuming a securely provisioned
environment. This will require the selection and modification of some API so that it
interfaces with the implemented hardware primitives. The third is to make it possible
for an arbitrary application of interest to make transparent use of MPC. While the
second thrust should make it possible for a user without FPGA expertise to employ
the hardware in MPC, the third one seeks to address a wider pool of possible users
and allow someone with little to no knowledge of MPC to solve their problem securely.
While a fully general system would be ideal, a wide-open scope is challenging. Pick-
ing a focus makes it more manageable. Machine learning (ML) is one field actively
being explored with MPC (Du & Atallah, 2001; Knott et al., 2020; Ohrimenko et al.,
2016; Zhao et al., 2019). Using MPC primitives deployed on FPGAs to construct
operations that serve ML appears to be a fruitful domain for work. With that in
mind, current work is focusing on implementing and demonstrating the effectiveness
of such hardware designs. Additionally, work seeking to automatically convert ML
problems into an MPC format and efforts to adapt existing secure environment provi-
sioning (Mosayyebzadeh et al., 2019) will enable the creation of a production system
accessible to a broad range of users.
In summary, we have theorized and then demonstrated the performance potential
of Secret Sharing MPC on FPGA hardware on a low-latency network. We developed
a Cloud Computing vision for MPCaaS with specific milestones. This architecture
would enable easier use of MPC, spurring adoption as a means of addressing some of
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the persistent secure data processing needs driven by the growth in big data. While
these thrusts notionally build upon each other, some exploratory work is progressing
on them in parallel.
1.7 Organization
Following this introduction (Chapter 1), the rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the reader with insights about the development and current status
of MPC, processing hardware, network communication, and cloud computing. This
information establishes the evolution and current features of the data center context.
Big data is shown to be a driver for more efficient processing and greater security.
Chapter 3 considers design motivations and details hardware testing including design
choices made when implementing MPC primitives on FPGAs. Chapter 4 covers hard-
ware testing. The data is analyzed and compared to results obtained by the original
authors of the protocol as well as to other related research. Chapter 5 steps away from
the low-level hardware and instead considers system level design for MPCaaS. This
includes the efforts related to provisioning and configuring an environment in a data
center. Finally, Chapter 6 offers some specific steps towards achieving a complete
MPCaaS and provides a final commentary on the research work accomplished.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 MPC & Secure Computing Algorithms
2.1.1 History
Though MPC has recently gained sufficient attention to be defined in the United
States Senate in 2019, the field has been actively researched over the past 40 years
(Evans et al., 2018; Shamir, 1979; Yao, 1986; Yao, 1982) with more practical imple-
mentations explored since the early 2000s. Research deployments of MPC have been
used to protect data in different fields including healthcare (D. W. Archer et al., 2018;
Giannopoulos & Mouris, 2018), education (Bogdanov et al., 2016; Feigenbaum et al.,
2004), finance (Abidin et al., 2016; Bogetoft et al., 2009; Damgård et al., 2017), and
technology (Bonawitz et al., 2017; Ion et al., 2019). Several companies have brought
commercial MPC offerings to the market, but many are customized for each client and
require expert knowledge to deploy and support (D. W. Archer et al., 2018; Hastings
et al., 2019).
In order to preserve data privacy, MPC fundamentally requires additional commu-
nication and computation overhead beyond that which the base computation requires.
Consequently, to create a truly general-purpose MPC system which is easy to adopt,
it is necessary to continue to improve the performance and ease of use while sup-
porting more types of problems. Specialized MPC systems will remain important
for performance critical applications and may offer a reasonable and focused start-
ing point for research in the short term. General MPC with reasonable performance
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will be needed to increase adoption by being easier to use and less costly to deploy.
Furthermore, if a particular task doesn’t need cutting edge speed, a general MPC
offering may be selected even by users already familiar with MPC simply because
of the relative ease to deploy vs. a more sophisticated solution. Existing work has
shown that acceleration of general-purpose MPC can translate into viable systems
(Y. Huang et al., 2012), which is encouraging for this vision.
To date, most MPC implementations are in software, and thus rely on general-
purpose processing hardware and commodity networking equipment. In such cases,
Secret Sharing tends to be network latency-bound whereas Garbled Circuits are often
compute-bound. Consequently, most of the prior focus in hardware acceleration has
been directed toward Garbled Circuits as they appear a more obvious target for
acceleration. We’ll discuss prior research further later on. First, we’ll consider some
of the frameworks that currently exist and what they each offer.
2.1.2 Taxonomy & Features
MPC protocols can be designed to accommodate an arbitrary number of compute
parties N (where N > 2) while tolerating some selected threshold T of those parties
being adversarial. A coalition of “bad” parties may be working together in an attempt
to break confidentiality in order to learn about other entities’ data or in an attempt
to tamper with the computation being performed.
While it has been known for 30 years that general-purpose MPC algorithms existed
and could be used to securely solve arbitrary problems, most of that work remained
theoretical until recently (early 2000s) as inefficiencies in the design of the protocols
prevented practical use (Hastings et al., 2019). Specialized protocols that could be
feasibly implemented were also researched during this time. While some of those have
more reasonable computing hardware requirements, the restricted scope of problems
they served still limited adoption. Lately, work on compilers that can automate the
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application of MPC to arbitrary problems has made general-purpose MPC feasible to
implement and opened an avenue for the development of systems that could see wider
adoption. Fairplay was the first notable implementation to show this was possible
(Malkhi et al., 2004).
MPC designs generally represent problems as either arithmetic or Boolean circuits
using some form of Garbled Circuit or Secret Sharing to secure the data which will
be used in a computation. Garbled Circuit protocols are two party compute (2PC)
systems. They rely on one party generating an encoded circuit representing the entire
problem of interest. This is transmitted to the second party along with any encoded
inputs held by the first party. The second party can then evaluate this circuit using
both parties encoded inputs and eventually obtain the solution. On the other hand,
Secret Sharing-based MPC systems have the compute parties evaluate each gate of
the circuit in parallel on their own pieces or shares of the data. A small amount of
network communication between parties is required for each multiplication or AND
gate (none is required for addition or XOR gates). It should be noted that the number
of parties only describes the systems being used to evaluate the protocol. While GC
designs are essentially 2-party and SS designs can be n-party (commonly 3 or 4 party),
there can be any number of clients contributing data and outsourcing the computation
to some set of compute parties running the MPC protocol. The client data must just
be encrypted and partitioned among the compute parties.
The computation and communication overhead of MPC manifests itself differently
for Garbled Circuits and Secret Sharing. The size of the encrypted representation
when using GC is such that each gate is a multiple of the number of bits of the chosen
security parameter. For example, a single two-input gate would be 4×κ bits because
each input could either be 0 or 1 requiring four possible inputs to be generated. If
AES-128 were being used where κ = 128, the amount of data for a single gate of
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this sort would be 4× 128 = 512 bits. Even with optimizations (Beaver et al., 1990;
Kolesnikov & Schneider, 2008; Naor et al., 1999; Yakoubov, 2017; Zahur et al., 2015),
Garbled Circuits have a large communication size (80-128× the size of the original
data); however, they benefit from a small constant number of communication rounds.
Consequently, the theoretical max throughput of GC designs over some network is
constrained by the bandwidth overhead. The fixed number of communication rounds
does give GC the edge in high-latency scenarios despite the overhead, but in an ideal
network with low latency, having fewer communication rounds doesn’t compensate
for the bandwidth cost.
Conversely, Secret Sharing approaches require a low-latency environment because
they involve many more rounds of communication, but they consume substantially less
bandwidth per computational step. This approach offers a higher potential maximum
throughput by avoiding the bandwidth overhead of Garbled Circuits. However, Secret
Sharing schemes have a number of communication rounds that increases in proportion
to the depth of the circuit being evaluated. This results in the latency also growing
with circuit depth. On a high latency network, the time cost is amplified. However,
the amount of data that needs to be exchanged per round of communication is small,
resulting in low bandwidth requirements. In comparison to GCs, this means that
Secret Sharing can achieve a higher throughput and make better use of the resources
available when used on a more ideal, lower latency, network.
Beyond the basic choice of protocol, there are numerous other considerations to
make before selecting a specific algorithm variant or implementation. Some are as
follows:
Different cryptographic schemes offer varying security guaranties. Approaches
that promise information-theoretic (IT) security indicate that even with an infinite
amount of computational power at their disposal, an adversary would not be able
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to compromise the design without certain information. Alternately, computationally
secure designs rely on how difficult certain calculations are to perform in order to
provide a guarantee about a system being secure from compromise. While some
ciphers have a “best by” date based on anticipated computational performance, others
have such a high threshold as to be practically secure forever (barring advancements
such as quantum computing).
As MPC protocols are concerned with protecting honest parties from adversarial
parties, it is important to consider how many possible adversaries of the total N
parties it is able to handle. In 2PC cases such as GC, it is necessary to consider the
worst case where n − 1 parties are corrupt and there is only a single honest entity.
However, when there are additional parties, a typical choice is to select supporting an
honest majority such that only fewer than n
2
of n parties may be adversarial. With an
honest majority assumption, all functions can be performed in an IT secure fashion,
which is not necessarily the case otherwise (Ben-Or et al., 1988; Chaum et al., 1988;
Evans et al., 2018).
Selecting the number of parties for a particular protocol can be influenced by
several considerations. While there is no theoretical limit to the number of compute
parties that can be supported, in practice, the more parties that exist, the greater
potential there is for one or more of them to experience some sort of failure. This
is exacerbated when there are large geographic distances or high latencies between
parties such as in systems operating over the internet. There is also additional com-
plexity in handling the large number of entities. It is relatively common to see three-
and four-party constructions because they avoid excess complexity and, in the three-
party case, map very neatly to an honest majority assumption where 2
3
parties at
least are expected to be honest.
The types of adversaries can also vary, and different protocols have varying as-
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sumptions about which might be encountered and can be handled. Semi-honest ad-
versaries will follow the rules of a given protocol correctly but may be attempting to
uncover information by performing other work on the side based on observations they
make. Malicious adversaries can actively be modifying data or diverging from ex-
pected steps in a protocol in an effort to prevent the computation, gain information,
or influence the result. While it might seem easy to say that a maliciously secure
protocol is preferable, there are many scenarios where parties may be sufficiently
trusted to follow a protocol or may be obliged to do so. Maliciously secure systems
generally require additional computational overhead to provide such guarantees over
semi-honest ones, and some situations may tip in favor of the additional performance
of a semi-honest approach.
As noted above with regards to selecting the number of parties, the environment
of operation (Global internet, single data center, or somewhere in between) will affect
the performance of various protocols. Many parties will generally increase failure
rate, distance will increase latency, and location of different parties may determine
the amount of computational power or network bandwidth available. Some problems
will require selecting a protocol that is most suitable; in other cases, crafting an ideal
environment for a particular protocol is an option.
Having discussed some of the considerations of MPC algorithms, we will next look
at some of the frameworks and tools that implement them.
2.2 Processing & Communication Hardware
As established earlier, MPC necessitates some overhead compared to operations per-
formed in the clear. This manifests itself both in terms of communication and com-
putation. In our proposed solution, we use hardware to improve the performance
of MPC in the hope that a reduced overhead will be more attractive to potential
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adopters. As we will cover later, changes in hardware and the way information sys-
tems are developed and deployed offer some new paths towards more accessible MPC.
2.2.1 History
For many years, using a generic CPU was sufficient for most applications because of
the regular performance increases between each generation of chips. This progression
is characterized by several trends that are reasonably well known. “Moore’s Law,” as
it became known, came from the 1965 observation by Gordon Moore (Moore, 2006),
then Director of Research and Development (R&D) at Fairchild Semiconductor, that
the transistor count appeared to be doubling on a roughly yearly basis. He later
updated this projection in 1975 to add that he expected that after 1980, the transis-
tor count would double approximately every two years. “Dennard Scaling” describes
another important observation alongside “Moore’s Law” and is named after Robert
Dennard who wrote about it in 1974 while working at IBM (Dennard et al., 1974).
Also known as MOSFET scaling, it notes that as transistors grow smaller the power
density remains constant (it relates to how much area the transistors are occupy-
ing). This essentially means that as transistors grow smaller, they can use less power.
Additionally, the clock speed can be increased for those transistors, increasing per-
formance. Taken together, “Moore’s Law” and “Dennard Scaling” meant that, for a
while, more transistors could fit in the same space year after year, and the individual
transistor had greater performance. An estimate of this performance boost is sum-
marized by “Koomey’s law” which considers the number of computations that can be
performed per joule of energy (Koomey et al., 2011).
While these trends fairly closely described the progress observed over many years,
Dennard Scaling came to an end around the early 2000s with Moore’s Law further
slowing beyond his modified prediction by 2010. When working at small chip scales,
the leakage current of transistors increased and resulted in greater heat generation
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(Kumar, 2015). Consequently, the substantial frequency increases that were previ-
ously expected between generations were no longer possible. While transistor size has
continued to decrease (allowing density to increase), the rate has slowed and Moore’s
law is expected to entirely end around 2025 as transistors reach their physical, atomic
limits.
With a limited ability to increase clock speeds, adding more processing cores
has been a primary strategy used to keep increasing performance in a post Dennard
Scaling world. IBM was the first company to develop a multi-core processor, the
POWER 4 (“Power 4 – The First Multi-Core, 1GHz Processor,” n.d.), which was
revealed in 2001. AMD released the first native dual-core processor in 2005 with Intel
releasing their first dual-core in 2006 (where native refers to the cores being located on
the same piece of silicon). Since then, core count has continued to increase such that
in 2021 AMD now offers several 64 core processors while Intel has a 56-core offering.
These are both architectures that make use of multiple chiplets (2 × 28 cores and
8 × 8 cores respectively). Though slightly beside the point, the single-die multicore
record from Intel is 40 (Xeon Platinum 8380) or 72 (if Xeon Phi is considered).
Additionally, Ampere is a company that focuses on ARM based processors and has
an 80-core processor available with a 128-core release seemingly planned for later in
2021 (both single-die) (Robinson, 2021).
Crafting architectures with increasing core counts and careful tuning such as dy-
namically adjusting the speed of certain cores has continued to extend performance.
However, fully leveraging the potential of a general architecture has become more chal-
lenging because of these many subtleties requiring additional thought to tune software
for specific hardware. As a result, there has been an increase in exploring process-
ing architectures tailored for specific tasks which make better use of the available
transistor budget. The most specialized are Application-Specific Integrated Circuits
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(ASICs) while Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and Graphics Processing
Units (GPUs) are some of the other, more popular, types of architecture. We’ll look
at each of these in the following section.
2.2.2 Processing Technology
Originally, GPUs were focused on providing specialized, highly parallelized silicon
that would be dedicated to managing display output for a computer leaving the cen-
tral processing unit (CPU) free to perform operations of interest. Researchers found
that the highly parallel architecture of GPUs was a good fit for other types of com-
putations. During the 1980s and 1990s some made use of these capabilities though
additional effort was required as these devices were not designed with general compu-
tations in mind. However, the usefulness of GPUs for other work was noted, and the
CUDA language and first GPU architecture designed specifically for general purpose
computations were released by Nvidia in 2006 (Harris, 2015). The primary competitor
to CUDA, OpenCL, which can be used to target heterogeneous platforms including
GPUs, first appeared in 2009. Since then, GPUs have gained wide acceptance and
use with machine learning (ML) being a large driver of interest and greatly benefiting
from GPUs performance (Raina et al., 2009).
ASICs have existed since the inception of integrated circuits and are designed to
serve a particular purpose. With specialization, it is possible to implement the most
efficient and greatest performance solution to a problem. The drawbacks to using
an ASIC include the time and effort needed to progress from an initial design to a
physical chip and the difficulty of fixing or modifying an existing design. For problems
whose solutions are mature and unlikely to change or where performance is required
at all costs, ASICs are a reasonable choice. Other approaches do offer more flexibility
and potentially lower cost from a greater production scale.
First introduced by Xilinx in 1984, FPGAs were touted as a viable alternative
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to ASICs for either small production volumes or where the absolute best perfor-
mance possible wasn’t required. Increasing transistor densities and performance per
transistor has meant that FPGAs, ASICs, and other technologies can offer greater
performance. However, developing devices on smaller and more advanced scales is
more complex and costly. The point at which ASICs are worth the additional cost
over FPGAs has shifted ever higher, increasingly leading FPGAs to appear in final
products. Taking a look at the epochs of FPGA technology, we can trace their shift-
ing role. From their creation until the early 1990s, FPGAs were fairly small, and
design automation techniques were not widespread. In more demanding applications,
multi-FPGA designs were used. During the 1990s, FPGAs benefited from semicon-
ductor process advancement increasing the number of gates that could be supported
in a given area and in connectivity, which made it possible for parts of a design that
are physically separated to be linked and logically in closer proximity. Design au-
tomation became crucial in effectively working with the larger quantity of resources
available on an FPGA. Designs were often able to fit on a single FPGA, and ASICs
faced further competition. During the early 2000s (until around 2007) FPGAs expe-
rienced the same types of challenges posed to other technologies reliant on the regular
improvement to transistor performance and size. As customers more commonly had
excess capacity on FPGAs at this time, producers addressed the mismatch in several
ways. Smaller, less powerful, but more efficient FPGAs targeted small applications.
As the largest FPGAs already had more capacity than most customers needed for
individual functions and no longer benefited as much by simply growing larger, ven-
dors started to add more dedicated functions instead. Specialized hardware blocks
included integrated CPUs, DSPs, memory, high-speed serial communication, and the
tools to use them. IP offerings also made it easier for customers to deploy functions
to FPGAs (and to fill up the free fabric – internal resources – that they had). Current
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FPGAs often consist of heterogeneous silicon designed to offer a cohesive application
platform that can be targeted from the ground-up (Trimberger, 2015).
As will be seen in the remainder of this thesis, three aspects of FPGA technology
are particularly relevant to this work: their use as accelerators, their use as commu-
nication devices, and their programmability. We discuss these in turn.
First, successful use of FPGAs as accelerators has been demonstrated in general
(Gokhale & Graham, 2005; Hauck & DeHon, 2008; M. C. Herbordt et al., 2007;
M. Herbordt et al., 2008; Khan et al., 2013) and in many specific applications such
as Molecular Dynamics where GPU-like performance has been achieved (Wu et al.,
2021; Yang, Geng, Wang, Patel, et al., 2019; Yang, Geng, Wang, Sheng, et al.,
2019). There are also several special advantages unique to FPGAs (among off-the-
shelf ICs). For example, they can be configured with arbitrary precision (Belanović &
Leeser, 2002; de Dinechin & Pasca, 2011; Sun et al., 2008). This has been especially
useful in cryptography (Agrawal et al., 2019; Sayilar & Chiou, 2014) and enables
efficient hardware implementation as will be seen in Section 3.4.2. One of the likely
applications of this work is in ML as both training and inference can be protected
using MPC. Ongoing efforts seek to support important operations for ML such as MM
and MAC (primarily discussed in Chapter 6). FPGAs have already proven crucial to
ML, especially in handling inference with non-uniform models (Geng, Li, et al., 2020;
Geng et al., 2021; Geng, Wu, et al., 2020), but also large-scale training (Geng et al.,
2018; Wang et al., 2020). As ML is a field of great interest, and both ML and MPC
benefit from FPGA deployment, their overlap seems like fruitful avenue for further
research.
The second aspect is that, among off-the-shelf ICs, FPGAs uniquely combine ac-
celerator capability with hardware support for communication. This has for decades
made them central to high-end communication switches (Bolaria & Byrne, 2009).
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Also, and critically to this thesis, in the last five years FPGAs have become widespread
in the data center. Of particular relevance is their use in smart NICs and in bump-
in-the-wire configurations (Caulfield et al., 2016). General purpose FPGA commu-
nication stacks have been developed both for clouds (Putnam, 2014) and clusters
(Boku et al., 2019; George et al., 2016; Plessl, 2018; Sheng et al., 2015), e.g., (Sheng,
Xiong, et al., 2017; Sheng, Yang, Caulfield, et al., 2017; Sheng et al., 2018). Recently
this work has been extended to support using FPGAs for support of MPI (Xiong,
Bangalore, et al., 2018; Xiong, Skjellum, et al., 2018) and compute-in-the-network
(Haghi, Geng, et al., 2020; Haghi, Guo, et al., 2020; Stern et al., 2018). We discuss
communication aspect further next in section 2.2.3.
Finally, much work has been done on FPGA programmability. When using FP-
GAs for low-level functions, as we do here in this thesis, precise implementation is
essential. While this is possible with standard HDLs and allows for fine control, it
limits portability. The standard method used to make the device more accessible
to non-FPGA programmers is HLS, e.g., using the Xilinx Vitis environment or the
Intel Quartus Prime environment built around OpenCL. The difficulty with such an
approach is that too much performance can be lost when using such abstraction,
although recent work has given direction in solving that problem (Sanaullah & Her-
bordt, 2018; Sanaullah et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2017).
Moving on from FPGAs and considering future processing developments, quantum
computing may eventually mature and become usable commercially. Such a change
promises to fundamentally alter how all systems are designed. Until that occurs
though, the use of heterogeneous architectures seems to be here to stay.
2.2.3 Communication Technology
Processing capabilities are not alone in seeing progress over time; continued improve-
ments in communication bandwidth have also been important both in serving clients
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over long distances as well as maximizing the utilization of networked systems in data
centers and particularly in high-performance computing (HPC) scenarios.
Edholm’s law was publicly attributed to Phil Edholm of Nortel Networks by John
H. Yoakum in 2004 (Cherry, 2004). The bandwidth of communication networks has
been increasing at an exponential rate, doubling every 18 months, just as Moore’s law
dictated for transistor count. This has been attributed to three primary innovations:
the advent of MOSFETs and the constant decrease in their size, lasers and their use
in communication systems, and information theory (Jindal, 2009).
We can see the increasing capacity of the Ethernet over time when we consider
the standards released by the IEEE 802.3 working group (Hajduczenia et al., 2016).
In 1998 and 1999 1 Gb Ethernet standards were released for fiber optic and twisted
pair respectively. 2002 and 2006 brought 10 Gb Ethernet to fiber and twisted pair.
The standards for 40 Gb and 100 Gb Ethernet over a backplane were released in 2010
and for optical fiber in 2015. 2017 brought 300 Gb and 400 Gb Ethernet over fiber.
The 2020 Ethernet Alliance roadmap (“2020 Roadmap: Ethernet Alliance,” 2020)
projects 800 Gb and 1.6 Tb Ethernet standards to be released in the next few years,
potentially between 2023 and 2025.
In the data center, these bandwidth increases are one factor that has allowed for
a growth in networked systems. The other element at play is the radix of switches.
Together, the connectivity and bandwidth determine how many devices can be di-
rectly linked and what type of switch hierarchy is necessary as the system scales
upwards. Higher bandwidth and radix switches make it possible to keep a flatter
network topology and reduce the number of hops necessary between systems. Im-
provements to switch ASICs, like other silicon, have tracked Moore’s law and offered
a steady improvement over time. Depending on the types of tasks being executed in
a particular data center, different clever network topologies can balance the distance
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between nodes, bandwidth, physical cabling constraints, and more.
While the bandwidth per link has been increasing regularly, what is available to
a home user when connecting to the internet lags behind. Nielsen’s Law is a rule of
thumb and that observes that generally a user will see their internet bandwidth grow
by 50% each year. Starting from a 300 bps modem in 1983 or thereabouts, the most
recent update in 2019 notes 325 Mbps (Nielsen, 2019).
Furthermore, even with the increase in bandwidth over time, latency is constrained
by the physics of the speed of light travelling across fiber optics. The relative locations
of networked systems will be the main determining factor for latency. Finally, in the
MPC cases we are considering, there is a small (single-digit) number of connected
systems. This makes it possible to avoid complex network designs, which can be
critical to consider in other data center applications with larger numbers of nodes.
Instead, as long as a system has sufficiently low latency (data center), the hardware
implementation of MPC can perform sufficient operations to fully utilize the available
bandwidth.
2.3 MPC with Special Hardware
As noted previously, GC approaches to MPC consume lots of network bandwidth
but don’t introduce much communication latency because they have a fixed number
of communication rounds. Consequently, such approaches can work well even when
parties can only communicate over a high-latency network (though bandwidth itself
will influence how long the communication will take). While effort has been made to
make GC representations more compact and bandwidth efficient, increasing network
bandwidth has likely also contributed to reducing the urgency of the network limi-
tations of such protocols. Indeed, prior hardware research has frequently focused on
improving the performance of garbling and evaluating, including a fair bit of work on
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FPGAs (Fang et al., 2017, 2019; Frederiksen et al., 2014; K. Huang et al., 2019; Hus-
sain & Koushanfar, 2019; Hussain et al., 2018; Järvinen et al., 2010a, 2010b; Leeser
et al., 2019; Songhori et al., 2019; Songhori et al., 2016).
With SS, while the network bandwidth is used sparingly, the communication la-
tency is critical to overall performance. As latency increases with the depth of the
circuit being evaluated, bigger problems will be more severely impacted. While net-
work bandwidth has increased over time, network latency is dependent on physical
distance between parties and avoiding the introduction of any delay in communica-
tion. To speed up a problem, the best strategy is to generate and process the flattest
circuit possible and parallelize processing. In that manner, more data can be sent in
the same communication round. The greater bandwidth efficiency does mean that
given the same network a SS approach saturating the connection will have a higher
throughput than a GC approach saturating the same connection.
GC and SS can both benefit from the increase in compute offered by accelera-
tors, improved network bandwidth, and the consolidation of these resources into data
centers. However, SS can better the utilization of those resources at the risk of addi-
tional latency, a trade which is likely to be appealing to data center providers seeking
to extract the most work from their resources. For problems that have large circuit
depth and that require the lowest latency, GC will still be preferable to SS, but this
seems like a minor drawback in the data center for an MPCaaS architecture.
When considering FPGAs for MPC, there are a number of ways in which they
might be deployed. As an isolated co-processor each party with an accelerator could
offload work to the FPGA, potentially freeing resources for other work although, as
a co-processor, performance may still be limited by the speed at which the main
processor or system can handle the necessary transactions with other parties. As
a bump-in-the-wire, an FPGA can potentially provide the same improvements as
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a co-processor but cut out the main processor or system from communication. In a
single-node cluster, multiple FPGAs may be located in the same system but belong to
different parties and communicate either directly through PCIe or other interconnects
like RapidIO. The main question would be with regards to whether such an approach
with a shared host can provide sufficient isolation between the parties. Finally, an
enclave or silo on a FPGA where multiple parties are placed on the same hardware
has the best potential performance by allowing for direct communication between
the parties. We see the most open questions about such an approach, however, as
guaranteeing sufficient isolation between entities present on the same hardware is very
challenging.
The earliest work in accelerating MPC appears to date back to 2010 with an
FPGA implementation of GC (Järvinen et al., 2010a, 2010b). The authors used
this to assess the potential for implementing GC on a smart-card as well as using
the FPGA as a stand-alone GC accelerator. Other work explored garbling entire
processors including MIPS (Songhori et al., 2016) and ARM (Songhori et al., 2019)
architectures (implemented on FPGAs for testing). Specialized problem acceleration
under MPC, including work on ML (Hussain et al., 2018), has also seen some interest.
Some MPC acceleration research has also explored employing GPUs (Frederiksen
et al., 2014; Husted et al., 2013; Pu & Liu, 2013; Pu et al., 2011), but that hasn’t
seen as much attention in the last few years with most efforts focusing on FPGAs,
particularly for GC (Fang et al., 2017, 2019; K. Huang et al., 2019; Leeser et al.,
2019). These and other efforts (Hussain & Koushanfar, 2019) identify cloud-based
FPGAs as desirable for GC evaluation with some performing testing on AWS.
The studies from researchers at Northeastern University are most relevant to the
efforts in this work. Their overlay architecture (Fang et al., 2017) and choice of data
centers (K. Huang et al., 2019) are similar to our own. Logical blocks which accelerate
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the garbling of AND and XOR operations were implemented so that data can be
passed to them without requiring the FPGA image to be recreated and reprogrammed.
This approach makes it possible for one design to process different MPC circuits.
2.4 Big Data & the Cloud
The term “big data” has been in use since at least the 1990s when it gained popu-
larity. The use of this term has most often been attributed to John Mashey in his
presentations while working at Silicon Graphics (Lohr, 2013; Mashey, John R., 1999).
Generally, it describes the type of datasets that defy conventional techniques of cap-
ture and analysis as a result of their scale. As hardware, software, and algorithmic
improvements continue to be made, handling the growing and changing “big data” is
a moving target that is never entirely solved.
2.4.1 Data Collection
One of the most obvious challenges in handling “big data” is the question of storage
capacity, which can be considered from both data density and marginal cost perspec-
tives. The storage medium influences cost, density, volatility, and read/write speed.
All of these factors play into determining which type of storage is best suited to dif-
ferent roles, including long-term storage, short-term storage, and working space in
different parts of a system architecture, such as cache, memory, or the file-system.
With density increasing and cost per unit falling, more data can be stored each
year. This is the result of both some major new technologies being introduced and
refinements to existing ones. The growth of solid-state storage (SSD), typically made
with non-volatile NAND Flash memory, has brought huge increases in read/write
performance and at a cost that has rapidly approached hard-drive (HDD) prices.
While the invention of Flash memory dates back to 1980 (patented shortly after
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(Masuoka & Iizuka, 1985)) and has been used over the years, its use alongside or
instead of HDDs really took off around 2010.
Additionally, in the last few years persistent memory (NVRAM) has become avail-
able (Clarke, 2015). Also known under the 3D XPoint or Optane names, persistent
memory is sufficiently rapid to be used as RAM. Though it is not quite as rapid as
volatile DRAM, it offers better performance than standard SSDs. In summary, there
is a more granular selection of storage technologies allowing for more nuanced trade-
offs to be made in system architectures. Going from high to low performance (and
low to high capacity) the hierarchy looks something like this: SRAM (CPU Cache),
DRAM (Memory), NVRAM (Persistent Memory), SSD (existing different cell counts
offering varying performance: SLC, MLC, TLC, QLC), HDD (varying platter counts
and more influence performance), and tape. All of these media play a role in making
it possible to more efficiently store and process “big data” by balancing capacity, cost,
and performance.
2.4.2 Data Processing
Beyond the capacity challenges discussed, information must be organized in some
manner when it is stored, ideally in a way that is most suitable to the types of
processing tasks it will see. Some important considerations for data management
systems include scalability, consistency, and efficiency. Scalability concerns how well a
particular database system can be spread across differently sized hardware resources;
for enormous amounts of data this can include systems networked across different
geographic regions and treated as one entity. Consistency becomes more challenging
with the size of a system and relates to whether data that is updated or added in
one location will appear the same or different elsewhere in the system. In some cases
eventual consistency, where the system guarantees that data will be the same after
some amount of time, is adequate. While we won’t spend much time on it here, the
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trade-off space has been explored with different design philosophies such as ACID and
BASE and some guiding concepts such as the CAP theorem (Brewer, 2012). Finally,
efficiency concerns the ability of a system to handle different quantities and types of
operations. Systems that have real-time requirements need to be sufficiently efficient
to handle operations with an output rate that at least matches the input rate.
One type of approach employed for structured data was to move away from SQL-
style relational databases to “NoSQL” designs (Kalid et al., 2017). Some examples
of development in this field include Google BigTable (F. Chang et al., 2006), Apache
Cassandra (Lakshman & Malik, 2010), and Amazon Dynamo (DeCandia et al., 2007).
Broadly speaking, some data consistency properties are traded in such systems for
greater performance. Alternately, a system like Google Spanner (Corbett et al., 2012)
is a distributed SQL database and uses a special consensus algorithm to achieve
consistency.
The use of computational frameworks improves the ability of users to work with
various data storage architectures. Some of these include Google Pregel (Malewicz
et al., 2010), Apache Hive (Thusoo et al., 2009), Google MapReduce (Dean & Ghe-
mawat, 2004), Apache Hadoop (Shvachko et al., 2010), Apache Spark (Zaharia et
al., 2010), PowerGraph (now owned by Apple) (Gonzalez et al., 2012), and Apache
Storm (Marz, 2014). Frameworks such as these offer support for varying sets of op-
erations, manners of decomposing (e.g., batch, streaming), and ways of organizing
and distributing them across resources within individual systems and entire clusters.
For example, the MapReduce concept, popularized in big data by Google and used
in “MapReduce” and Hadoop, consists of breaking tasks into filtering/sorting steps
(mapping) that select relevant data and then applying processing steps on that data
(reduction).
An additional layer includes file-system options for storage such as GFS (Ghe-
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mawat et al., 2003) and Ceph (Weil et al., 2006). Higher-level scheduling can be
managed with systems like Borg (Verma et al., 2015), Mesos (Hindman et al., 2011),
and Kubernetes (Burns et al., 2016). Tasks and processes can use Xen (Barham et
al., 2003) or containers for virtualization. The use of SDNs and other programmable
network management, such as Google’s B4 (Jain et al., 2013), have helped make it
possible to maximize the utilization of network resources, improve security, simplify
management, and gain more insights.
2.4.3 Security & Efficiency
The use of big data raises varied security and privacy questions. Addressing these
while maintaining efficiency is critical to obtaining value from the data collected. The
taxonomy of big data security and privacy considerations are nicely summarized by
NIST (W. Chang et al., 2019). Some of the important ideas to note are that big
data sets may not be able to be managed with a single security scheme and may
instead need different policies and mechanisms for various subsets. Additionally, the
provenance and state of data may differ. Classic approaches to dis-identifying PII
may no longer be sufficient, especially when multiple data sources are used together
in ways that were not planned for. There are opportunities in different data collection
mechanisms for errors or failures that can compromise the information collected, for
example from many IoT devices, some of which may not be online at a given moment.
Certain types of data that historically were too large for big data analysis, such as
high-resolution geospatial data, can now be processed and have perhaps not been
prepared or protected appropriately with the cloud in mind. While it’s easy to con-
ceptualize the cloud as something omnipresent but amorphous, the physical location
of the component data centers has political and regulatory significance. Navigating
various countries’ laws and norms for hosts, clients, and any data conduits can be
complex for both privacy and security because of the large number of stakeholders.
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While there are many strategies and tools for managing these different types of
risks, it is difficult for many organizations to adequately prepare and adopt safeguards.
Doing so requires additional time, effort, and cost upfront and it can be difficult to
convince those unfamiliar with the risks to prepare in this fashion, especially if there
is no regulatory requirement that must be met or if they exist but lack teeth. Despite
the work that is needed on this front, working to make secure tools easier to use (such
as MPC) will help simplify addressing these challenges.
2.4.4 Data centers & the Cloud
Simply put, the concept of cloud computing is that instead of using local resources
for running a service, an entity can pay to use resources that someone else owns and
maintains. One reason for using a cloud provider is that it allows an organization
that doesn’t specialize in computer hardware, software, or services to gain access to
business-critical resources without having to take on the overhead of owning their own
equipment or hiring employees to handle it. With well implemented cloud systems,
there is also less lead-time in getting up and running. While existing companies can
benefit from cloud, allowing them to focus on their core objectives, cloud can also
make it far easier for startups to get up and running. They can start with some small
number of resources but scale up rapidly if business grows (or down if the model
doesn’t work out).
Additionally, there is at least the notion that cloud computing is, or at least should
be, a fungible commodity. A consumer doesn’t necessarily care who is providing the
computation and storage they consume, and it should be possible to move their
tasks to a different provider if there is a lower cost. However, this isn’t necessarily
the case with some of the large commercial providers. There are frequently low or
no costs for importing data into or moving it around within a particular provider’s
infrastructure but higher costs to export that data to a local system or to migrate
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it to some other cloud provider. Additionally, different cloud providers seek to offer
specialized services rather than simply hosting standard tools. While some special
tools might have unique features, users that employ them will find it much harder to
leave a specific cloud provider when it is easier to just use other tools the provider
has designed to be compatible. Furthermore, the additional cost to move data to
another provider on top of potentially having to retool is a disincentive. There are
some efforts to at least offer ways for more fungible systems to exist such as through
the Open Cloud Exchange (OCX) model (Demchenko et al., 2013; Desnoyers et al.,
2015).
Data centers can be located near inexpensive power sources such as hydroelectric
facilities. Operating at a huge scale, it is possible to have a few workers dedicated to
keeping everything running while minimizing the human cost per system. Accepting
that systems are “cattle not pets” is also critical. It is easier to make the most cost-
effective choice, such as running systems at a warmer temperature and accepting
some additional failures because the cost of replacing a system is less than the cost of
additional cooling. Keeping to that same idea, using a limited and consistent set of
hardware, OSs, and other software helps to reduce the headache of managing different
systems and for developers, targeting different platforms. While cloud providers can
reduce operational costs, they charge users a huge markup. The capital expenses for
a user to run their own system are substantial, and as humans are not fractional, a
system must be large enough to justify the workers to operate it. Running a variety
of different tasks can also help to ensure there is sufficient utilization as various
operations go through different ebbs and surges. At a certain scale, it still makes
sense to “roll-your-own.”
Centralizing different tasks into a single data center also allows for surges and
ebbs in compute demand to be better balanced keeping the overall utilization of the
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resources higher and more efficiently serving customer needs. Distributed hardware
run by individual companies is likelier to be run at a fraction of capacity and be sized
to handle the peak need anticipated. This approach means that there is more idle
hardware and less efficient use of resources. For large enough companies, centralizing
and running their own cloud can help to achieve the same benefits that dedicated
cloud providers see.
2.4.5 Deployment Models
There exists a range of deployment and use models as a result of cloud computing
services (“IaaS vs PaaS vs SaaS,” n.d.; Wagoner, 2019). Below some of the most
common ones are summarized from the lowest level where users have control that
most closely resembles managing their own hardware, to the highest level where there
is the most abstraction of the underlying hardware and software.
• IaaS: Infrastructure offerings like OpenStack provide mechanisms or abstrac-
tions to allocate low-level resources such as cores, memory, and storage space.
Clients can then typically run their operating system of choice on the resources
they choose and can even create their own network topologies between different
hardware allocated. This is the closest offering to owning and operating your
own hardware.
• CaaS: Container offerings move up a layer of abstraction and allow for users
to run their software in discrete virtualized environments where resources are
managed by the provider. Unlike virtual machines which are entirely separate,
containers can share a common OS kernel and libraries.
• PaaS: Platform offerings are mostly still beneficial for developers and are sce-
narios where the provider manages hardware and software and provides some
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abstraction upon which code and applications can still be developed. The ben-
efit for the user is that they can focus on their application development without
being caught up in managing more details of the systems they are running on.
• FaaS: Function offerings allow users to create or use discrete widgets that are
not full featured applications. These can be employed individually or plugged
together to obtain the desired functionality without needing to deal with any
lower-level management of the system. Additionally, discrete functions can be
updated individually and still used in combination together.
• SaaS: Software offerings are the most abstract and are managed and licensed by
a third party to the end user such that the details of operating and maintaining
the software are hidden. In principle, updates and distribution can be managed
by the provider without requiring effort on the part of the user.
2.5 Takeaways
Here are a few takeaways after having considered the history and current status of
MPC techniques, computer hardware, advent of big data, and the growth of cloud
computing. MPC is a field that has seen a great amount of theoretical work and
that has more recently reached a point where it is feasible to implement for more
than just research efforts. Hardware has seen some large changes with the paradigm
for computing moving in the direction of heterogeneous processing (including accel-
erators), communication bandwidth increasing, and storage technology diversifying
and offering a larger trade-off space between capacity and performance. The in-
creased sources for data collection, capacity for storage, and desire for more insights
related to “big data” have resulted in the need for new technological and algorith-
mic approaches to better use and to better protect the information gathered. The
efficiency improvement and client ease of use offered by cloud computing has accel-
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erated the clustering of compute power into specific, tightly knit data centers. With
more data and greater interconnection between systems, there are many security and
privacy risks, but also many opportunities to gain greater knowledge. Research such
as the work by Schneider and Zohner (Schneider & Zohner, 2013) demonstrated the
performance possibilities for Secret Sharing to compete with Garbled Circuits in a
low-latency environment such as a data center. Our work, using FPGAs to accelerate
SS MPC in the data center and developing an MPCaaS vision, shows that there is
still more that can be done to address the performance overhead and knowledge cur-
rently required to use such a system. Moving forward, finding ways to make it easier
to use techniques such as MPC will help users and companies to address risks while




The primary motivation of this work is to demonstrate the viability of MPCaaS
and provide a plan that can achieve that goal. It should be high performance and
easy for the average user to employ. Most existing MPC implementations require
substantial manual effort and expertise to configure, and they are often network
bounded, particularly when executed over long distances. We want users to be able to
make use of cloud resources while transparently running their applications of interest
on an MPC system.
Because MPC requires multiple computing parties for security and low latency
networking for performance, we consider processing hardware owned by different par-
ties and housed within a single data center. Compute parties will each receive input
data shares and then communicate throughout evaluation of problems. Other ser-
vices offered by cloud providers require data input by users. Consequently, clients
may already keep some of their data silos in the same data center. If the MPC ser-
vice is hosted in the same location, it can also benefit from faster access to inputs.
Concretely, we imagine a scenario where a small number of FPGAs are connected
over high-speed interconnects and have the benefit of drawing data from servers all
co-located within the data center. FPGA hardware acceleration has seen increas-
ing adoption in data centers. This includes Machine Learning training and evalua-
tion, image and video processing, network management, and packet analysis. FPGA
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hardware properties, as described in Section 2.2.2, and co-location should yield high
throughput for MPC protocols based on Secret Sharing, as such designs make the
most effective use of available bandwidth. Cloud providers care about throughput
because maximizing it means they are able to serve more clients using the same hard-
ware over time. The security and reliability of the system is an important factor when
relying on data center resources and needs to be considered before a MPC solution is
fully adopted. We will show how our work confirms our ideas for SS MPC on FPGAs
in the following sections.
3.2 Design Choices
In this work, the decision was made to focus on a simple and efficient protocol that
could be used in a broad number of scenarios and that might be conducive to hard-
ware acceleration in the data center. Hypothesizing that a Secret Sharing solution
would best be able to take advantage of the low-latency communication in a data
center, we focused on such candidates with the goal of verifying that concept. Even-
tually, a 3-party protocol tolerating 1 adversarial party who “semi-honestly” follows
the protocol was chosen. The small number of computing parties simplifies commu-
nication between each other while semi-honest behavior is acceptable in many types
of computation. Furthermore, additional existing algorithm work (Araki et al., 2017)
addresses how such a system can be extended to provide security against malicious
adversaries. Finally, having a small number of compute parties makes it much easier
to imagine mapping such an algorithm to several discrete FPGAs owned by different
entities and co-located in the same data center. We ruled out GPUs for this selected
context because their communication capabilities are constrained relative to FPGAs.
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3.3 Protocol & Algorithm Details
Within the category of MPC protocols based on Secret Sharing, we selected a protocol
(Araki, Barak, Furukawa, Lindell, et al., 2016; Araki, Furukawa, et al., 2016) for
FPGA acceleration due to its simplicity and algorithmic efficiency. The base Araki
et al. protocol employs exactly 3 parties, and tolerates 1 adversarial party that is
presumed to follow the protocol. Communication occurs in a ring topology, with all
parties sending data in the same direction (clockwise or counter-clockwise). MPC
schemes based on an honest-majority such as Araki et al. are straightforward to
define with three parties, the minimum quantity required. Small numbers of parties
are not typically limiting for most MPC applications. It should be noted that the
more parties that are added and the greater the separation between them, the more
likely it is that an MPC operation will experience greater latency or will fail from
connectivity issues. This reinforces the practical benefits of performing MPC in a
data center with a limited number of parties.
The workflow involves 3 distinct steps. First, data holders split their data into
secure shares that are distributed among the 3 compute parties. The shares are con-
structed such that any two of the compute parties can decide to reveal data and
have sufficient information in a pair of shares to do so. Then, the parties iteratively
compute over these shares without revealing any secrets. Finally, the compute parties
reveal their shares to the output party who can reconstruct the final answer. Al-
ternately, they could reconstruct the answer among themselves by exchanging their
shares with each other.
We implemented both Boolean and arithmetic types of Secret Sharing circuit rep-
resentations as described by the authors. The distinction between these two categories
is based around the usage of an algebraic ring modulo 2n. Operations where n > 1
bits are used as a single value employ arithmetic gates such as addition or multipli-
38
cation. We opted to use n = 128 for our arithmetic implementation. For the case
where n == 1, each bit is an independent Boolean value. When considering these,
we used 128 independent Boolean gates to match the quantity of data in our n = 128
arithmetic gates. In the Boolean case, XOR is equivalent to addition and AND to
multiplication. We explore the details of each step below.
3.3.1 Secret Sharing
When following the protocol of Araki et al. input data must be prepared in a partic-
ular fashion to be distributed among the three compute parties. The initial value v
is processed such that each party i ∈ 1, 2, 3 obtains a share tuple (xi, ai). As we will
see in the following steps, this will ensure that any two parties have sufficient data
to reconstruct the original value using one of the values in their tuple share and the
opposite value from the tuple of one of the other parties.
The entity holding the secret value v, either a client or one of the compute parties,
selects random values following Eq. 3.1, essentially, values that fit in a binary domain
n bits long (e.g., for an n = 8-bit field each random value must be 8 bits).
x1, x2, x3 ∈ Z2n (3.1)
These shares must obey Eq. 3.2 if the shares being generated are arithmetic; oth-
erwise, they are Boolean and must obey Eq. 3.3. It should be noted that the ai
component of the share tuple belonging to party i derives from xi−1 which is from
the neighboring party. This is essentially a one-time pad and the reason that the xi
from the neighboring party can be used to reveal the original value.
Arithmetic:










Figure 3·1: Initial Secret Sharing
Boolean:
x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 = 0 then ai = xi−1 ⊕ v (3.3)
Refer to Figure 3·1 to visualize how a value holder can generate the three shares
to be distributed to the compute parties.
3.3.2 Compute Phase
In the compute phase, the parties work together to solve a problem in a privacy-
preserving manner and generate a result that is also in the secure share format.
When solving a circuit in Boolean form, XOR or AND operations are used whereas
when an arithmetic circuit is solved, addition and multiplication operations are used.
It is easiest to imagine fan-in 2 operations proceeding sequentially with inputs (xi, ai)
and (yi, bi), though we stress that this process is embarrassingly parallel. The shares









Figure 3·2: Party i’s contribution toward computing an XOR gate
Addition/XOR operation
The addition/XOR operations can be performed locally by each party using the shares
that they already hold. Communication is not required. Figure 3·2 provides a visual
representation of these operations with two example shares (xi, ai) and (yi, bi).
XOR: Each party can compute the XOR of their individual shares simply by
performing a local xor of the individual parts in the pair because a one-time pad is
homomorphic under the ⊕ operation (see 3.4).
z = x⊕ y and c = a⊕ b (3.4)
Addition: Similar to XOR, individual parties can perform a simple addition of
arithmetic shares using their local information without the need for communication
(see 3.5).
z = x+ y and c = a+ b (3.5)
Multiplication/AND operation
The multiplication/AND operations require each party to perform a number of com-
putations and to exchange information with the other parties for the process to
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complete. Because communication is required, the depth or serial number of mul-
tiplication/AND operations is what determines the latency for solving a particular
problem.
AND operation: The first step a party takes is to produce a correlated random
value α ∈ {0, 1} which follows Eq. 3.6. That is to say, the random numbers produced
by all three parties must XOR to 0; more on that later. The second step requires
each party to calculate ri by combining the halves of the two input share tuples as
shown in Eq. 3.7. At this point each party passes their ri value to one other party
member (clockwise as shown here) so that each party now holds ri and ri−1. Araki et
al. show that the values ri have the property that r1⊕ r2⊕ r3 equals the result of the
AND gate. Hence, the 3 parties collectively know the (sensitive) result of the AND
gate, but any 2 parties do not because the remaining ri value acts as a one-time pad.
Finally, each party can compute the output share (z, c); only one half requires the
data from a neighbor as shown in Eq. 3.8. The shares built in this fashion maintain
the invariant that any 2 of the parties can reconstruct secret values, but any 1 party
cannot.
α1 ⊕ α2 ⊕ α3 = 0 (3.6)
ri = (xi ∧ yi)⊕ (ai ∧ bi)⊕ αi (3.7)
z = ri ⊕ ri−1 and c = ri (3.8)
Multiplication operation: Performing multiplication for arithmetic shares is very
similar to performing AND for Boolean shares as described above. The first step
is also to have each party generate correlated random values. Given the nature of
arithmetic shares, these must be chosen such that α ∈ Z2n , following Eq. 3.9. The
second step requires each party obtain ri by combining the halves of the two input
share tuples as shown in Eq. 3.10. Due to the unique nature of the shares and their
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set associativity, we take advantage of the modular multiplicative inverse for our q
value. As with the AND gate, communication between parties is necessary at this
point with ri being passed along. Finally, each party can finish calculating their
individual share (z, c) as shown in Eq. 3.11.
α1 + α2 + α3 = 0 (3.9)
ri = (ai · bi − xi · yi + αi) · q where q · 3 ≡ 1 (mod 2n) (3.10)
z = ri−1 − ri and c = −2ri−1 − ri (3.11)
Having now considered how AND and multiplication operations can be executed,
let’s revisit the correlated random values. These values have nothing to do with
the sensitive data, but they make it possible to perform operations on the secret
shares while keeping them protected. Now, it is possible for the parties to pick
random values, exchange them, and generate a new correlated random number on
the fly. However, doing so would require an additional communication step. As
a correlated random number is consumed for each AND/multiplication, this would
mean that instead of a single communication for exchanging ri there would be a
second communication. SS already is most bottlenecked by communication latency,
so avoiding this additional communication is preferable. Instead, each compute party
selects their own cryptographic key at random such that ki ∈ {0, 1}κ where κ is the
security parameter (i.e., the number of bits). Once chosen, each party shares their
key with one other party (to the left) and receives the key selected by the other party.
The party can use their key and the other party key along with a publicly known
ID “message” as inputs to a PRF to generate correlated randomness. This avoids
communication at the cost of some additional computation by each party. We use
AES in counter mode as our PRF. By incrementing the counter that is local to each
party in lockstep and using the same keys, the same pseudo-random value can be
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Figure 3·3: Party i’s contribution toward computing an AND gate
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found independently. Furthermore, since using the PRF doesn’t require knowing the
shares that will be used, it can be computed ahead of time so that a correlated random
value is ready to use as soon as the inputs are determined. Figure 3·3a) illustrates
this process for one party. Subsequently, Figure 3·3b details the calculation of ri, and
Figure 3·3c shows how to obtain the final share after ri values are exchanged.
3.3.3 Data reconstruction
In the reconstruction phase, we presume that the compute parties have calculated
shares (x′i, a′i) corresponding to the output value v′. Then, the parties can obtain v′
in the clear by revealing their shares (each party needs the share from one of the other
parties) and combining them as shown in Eq. 3.13 for Boolean shares or Eq. 3.12 for
arithmetic shares.
Arithmetic:
v′ = zi−1 − ci (3.12)
Boolean:
v′ = zi−1 ⊕ ci. (3.13)
3.3.4 Extensions
We focus on the Araki et al. Secret Sharing using 3 parties as our starting point.
Extensions of this protocol exist to provide more security over malicious individuals
or allow for more party members (Araki et al., 2017; Furukawa & Lindell, 2019;
Furukawa et al., 2017). As our initial goal was to provide evidence toward the benefits
of accelerating MPC in the data center, we focused on the semi-honest case while
leaving the option to extend our implementation to support the maliciously secure
version of the protocol. Our FPGA implementation of the semi-honest protocol could
also be extended with other features such as dynamically switching between share
types or MPC protocols in the pursuit of greater performance (Demmler et al., 2015;
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Mohassel & Rindal, 2018). Since these initial efforts, there have also been a number
of four-party SS MPC protocols (Dalskov et al., 2020; Gordon et al., 2018; Koti et al.,
2020) that provide malicious security and may be more interesting to implement than
a three-party maliciously secure protocol.
3.4 Implementation Details
3.4.1 Platform Choices
The hardware employed for different tests changed throughout the course of this work.
The very initial work in implementing MPC primitives targeted an Intel Arria 10 GX
development kit installed in a CAAD research group desktop. This hardware was
primarily chosen because of its availability. The design used a softcore, specifically
the Nios II, on the FPGA to manage data I/O and provide the external triggering
logic to operate the MPC AND primitive implemented in HDL. A custom instruction
for the Nios enabled simple software control of the hardware MPC AND operation.
Some initial information and insights were gathered from this testing, which will be
discussed in the results section. Some limitations led to a change of hardware for
subsequent research.
The second implementation makes use of Amazon Web Service (AWS) Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2) FPGAs available through “F1” type instances. This platform
offered Xilinx Virtex UltraScale+ VU9P FPGAs accessible via a virtual machine
in the EC2 F1 instances. The environment also included a hardware shell for soft-
ware/hardware co-design between the node CPU (Intel Xeon E5-2686 v4) and FPGA.
Software to control the FPGA uses provided DMA functions and PCIe function tem-
plates. This furnishes the mechanism for loading data, controlling operations, and
retrieving results. The design deployed here is able to generate PCIe packets to pass
in data and commands which are translated through the Amazon shell and then
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passed to the hardware functions using the AXI bus. We use the general purpose
AXI bus supporting a 512-bit data packet to provide a single message containing
two secret share vectors (4×128-bits) prior to starting the hardware operations. The
HDL design takes each AXI bus message, parses the information, and relays data to
a specific implemented module.
One of the motivations for selecting to use AWS was to gain some familiarity
and insight with using cloud deployed accelerators. Additionally, several choices of
F1 instance exist and seemed attractive. The Amazon AWS F1 instances include
options for 1, 2, or 8 FPGAs under the F1.2xlarge, F1.4xlarge, or F1.16xlarge names.
Documentation describes two different inter-board communication approaches. Com-
munication between FPGAs in the F1.4xlarge and F1.16xlarge instances is possible
at 12 Gbps over PCIe by routing through the host system. Alternatively, using
FPGA Direct to enable FPGA access to each other’s DRAM over PCIe is possible
for lower latency but requires developer implementation of the protocol and trans-
fer engine (Services, 2016) (See FAQs.md). Additionally, FPGAs should have the
ability to communicate directly over a 400 Gbps serial ring link (Services, 2016) (see
AWS_Shell_ERRATA.md), but, unfortunately, we discovered that support is only
tentatively planned in a future release. It might be possible to make use of the hard-
ware in this fashion but would currently require implementing a custom system to
handle this communication. In testing the proposed Secret Sharing block, we made
use of an AWS F1.2xlarge instance as our initial verification, and proof of concept
tests only required a single FPGA. The option remains to rent a larger instance,
deploy parties to dedicated FPGAs, and employ PCIe for communication.
3.4.2 Hardware Implementation
Our HDL design work for the MPC primitives started with a focus on the AND
operation for Boolean shares while targeting the Arria 10. While the platform was
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subsequently shifted to AWS necessitating control logic changes, the existing work on
the primitives was retained and further developed. Later work included XOR prim-
itives and supported arithmetic shares in addition to Boolean ones. The arithmetic
and Boolean designs share many common elements, as is seen in the similar logic de-
scribed in section 3.3. With individual primitives, a hardware design can be used to
selectively partition resources between XOR/addition gates and AND/multiplication
gates. Since all gates are routed individually, connecting gates to form a specific
circuit or equation can be done either through the software host process or with an
agreed upon hardware change between all party members. If a reasonable mix of
gates is programmed onto the FPGA, the need to create and program a new bit-
stream with a different design can be avoided, saving time. The implemented gates
can be arranged in software to process any sequence of MPC operations.
Additionally, multiple gates could be chained together to support higher level
functions such as matrix multiply or multiply accumulate (MAC). Previous work
done with matrix multiply shows efficient methods of using Garbled Circuits to ac-
celerate the generation of MPC circuitry before passing the garble tables over to the
participating party member (K. Huang et al., 2019; Hussain et al., 2018; Leeser et
al., 2019). Our approach to matrix multiply using SS would perform all computa-
tion jointly across the parties during run-time. One optimization is to perform all
of the multiplication on shares locally prior to performing the necessary communica-
tion, avoiding multiple latency penalties for each element in an MM operation. An
additional option is to take advantage of the fact that the correlated random bits
produced by the PRF don’t all have to remain together. In the Boolean case they
are all independent while in the arithmetic case different quantities can be combined
together arbitrarily. This may become more critical when seeking to most efficiently
perform operations with data of a fixed precision type.
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Within the MPC primitives, we make use of two different OpenCores projects
(Castillo, 2004; Hsing, 2012) for Random Number Generator (RNG) and for AES
operations (our choice for PRF). These cores provided a convenient, working starting
point. In a production design, we would plan to utilize vendor specific RNG hard
cores, perhaps dependent on a physically unclonable function (PUF), or alternately
make use of a different HDL design if it can be better optimized for the targeted
hardware. Considering the security of the OpenCores RNG module was not within
the scope of this work but would be necessary in the future when making a selection
between different vendor specific tools and designs. The MPC primitives make use of
the RNG core during initial key generation, share splitting phase, and the correlated
random requirements in both AND and multiply gates. The AES core is used as the
PRF that is needed during correlated random value generation.
In our design, prior to performing any MPC computations, each party generates
an initial random key using the RNG block. As the RNG block we use produces a
32-bit output, we concatenate four values to obtain a 128-bit long key (as required for
AES-128). This key is both stored locally and shared with one other party (such that
all keys are passed in the same direction around the ring). A public ID value visible
to all the parties is set to 0; in the actual implementation, each party holds its own
local copy. This ID ensures the correlation of the random numbers being generated
and is incremented for each new value keeping the parties in lockstep. Each party
then holds two keys, the ID is consistently set, and the PRF can be used.
When initializing the AES-128 core, 21 clock cycles are needed to obtain the first
output. As long as new desired values are fed in on each clock cycle, the system is
fully pipelined, and each additional clock cycle after initialization will produce another
output. When initially implementing the MPC AND/multiplication operation, the
two keys held by a party are alternated every cycle and the ID is incremented every
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other cycle. Consequently, after initialization, the single AES core will take two
cycles and output the pseudo-random values for both keys associated with the first
ID value. The next two cycles will produce the values associated with the next ID,
etc. This construction allows for one less AES core to be used, but does come at the
cost of an additional clock cycle. In our results, we will see that this does not prevent
very impressive results but for a system that is fully pipelined, using two AES cores
allows for a new value every cycle. The function f(Ki, Ki+1) (see Figure 3·3a) used
to combine the two PRF outputs into a correlated random value is pre-determined
when the party selects to use Boolean (Eq. 3.15) or arithmetic operations (Eq. 3.14).
Arithmetic:
α1 + α2 + α3 = 0 and αi = PRF (Ki)− PRF (Ki+1) (3.14)
Boolean:
α1 ⊕ α2 ⊕ α3 = 0 and αi = PRF (Ki)⊕ PRF (Ki+1) (3.15)
The MPC AND module itself consists of a few bitwise operations that produce
the intermediate ri values (Figure 3·3b). Most latency occurs in the transmission of
the Ri values since the final step (Figure 3·3c) depends on them.
Based on the minimal data dependencies for the AND/multiply operation, in
principle, a fully pipelined HDL implementation could consume and produce a new
pair of input shares each cycle. Using AES block size as we are, that would allow each
module to output 128 Boolean gates (or some combination of arithmetic gates adding
to 128) each clock cycle. Such a design could saturate a 10 Gbps network connection
if operated at 78.13 MHz or greater. While the implementation tested does not quite
reach one output per clock cycle, this thought experiment does give an idea of the
ability of a SS MPC design to maximize the utilization of available bandwidth. As we
will see as we consider test results, this is also achievable while leaving FPGA fabric




The following sections will describe various stages of development and testing MPC
SS primitives on an FPGA. This includes the following: a first test considering a
single party and Boolean AND module to verify function and resource utilization,
another which tested multiple parties and AND modules and which duplicated these
sets of three to again consider resource utilization, a final set of tests again using three
parties but which improved the MPC primitive performance and extended support
to both arithmetic and Boolean shares.
Given our focus on maximizing throughput, our multi-party design seeks to obtain
an idea of the upper bound for maximum utilization of a single FPGA exclusively
performing MPC. While we eventually plan to deploy parties across multiple FPGAs
connected in a ring, our test environment currently consists of placing three parties
on a single FPGA as this avoids limiting our communication bandwidth, allowing us
to find the maximum possible performance. We do note that while multiple compute
parties sharing a single FPGA is attractive for offering the best possible real-world
performance, we only use such a configuration for the performance testing as previ-
ously stated. There are many more security challenges that require research to verify
that the parties can be adequately isolated in such a configuration. More practically,
our tests can help to determine how best to allocate resources and size the network
for a multi-FPGA MPC deployment.
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The design includes the necessary routing and control logic to perform calculations
between all parties from start to end without software intervention. Again, because
this was performed as a test on a single FPGA, there is also a single host computer that
is used to load the data and operations onto three parties. In a final implementation,
each FPGA would have its own host system which would handle data and operation
loading.
With regards to the data we collect and present, a de facto metric of performance
of MPC within the cryptography community is the rate of computing the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). This exists as a Boolean circuit comprising thousands
of AND and XOR gates. Because the performance of MPC depends largely on the
number of AND and XOR gates and only minimally on its topology, knowing MPC’s
performance on AES provides some insight into performance on other computations.
We consider our tests in the context of this and other metrics; more on that in Section
4.3.
4.1.1 Test with Arria 10
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, initial testing targeted an Intel Arria 10 FPGA and
used the Nios II softcore to operate test software for loading data and triggering the
MPC AND hardware. Using a basic implementation of the Nios II Custom Instruction
required a multi-cycle approach because of the limited data width that could be passed
with each individual command. There are circumstances where a softcore is viable.
In our case, to avoid the multi-cycle latency penalties, we would perhaps have used
local storage, which could be accessed with a wider data bus, or other techniques to
avoid having to load individual data values and an operation command in sequence.
Regardless, we did decide to eventually move to a different platform, but our
work with the Arria 10 did provide some initial insights. With a single MPC AND
design synthesized in Quartus, targeting the Arria 10 (10AX115S2F45I1SG) on our
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development board, we found the following: The most constrained resource for a single
AND was the 704.5 Kb of M20K block memory consumed post-synthesis, making it
possible to estimate the utilization to be ∼1.32% based on the total 53.260 Mb of
M20K available on the Arria 10. Maximizing use of the fabric, this would permit ∼76
instances, or perhaps more realistically using 70% of the fabric might allow for ∼54
instances of the MPC AND. At this point in development, the MPC AND required
6 clock cycles between operations, which meant that when employing 6 groups of 8
MPC AND instances (48 total), it was possible for 8 transactions to begin each cycle.
Even with this imperfect arrangement, a quick calculation shows that 8 of our AND
operations (128 bits wide) per cycle at 200 MHz are sufficient to saturate a ∼205
Gbps connection, far more than the 10 Gbps link tested by Araki et al. with their
software implementation of the protocol. While only a single party with one core was
actually implemented and tested on the development board, the resource results and
our calculations encouraged us to continue this work.
4.1.2 Initial Test with AWS
With these synthesis results from Quartus, but also seeking to avoid some of the
challenges of the Nios II and to find a more fitting cloud target, we looked to Amazon
Web Services (AWS). On AWS, our evaluation of the implemented MPC SS modules
considers total FPGA resource utilization and total throughput with all gates running
in parallel. Our implementation on this platform still requires an initial 21 cycles
of pre-computation to prepare party keys and the first correlated random values.
Repeating the same configuration as on the Arria 10, for a single 1-party block post-
routing, the Virtex Ultrascale+ in the F1 instance utilizes ∼3.20% of its resources.
It should be noted that while the Intel Quartus implementation only appeared to
use ∼1.32%, that was a post-synthesis value rather than post-routing as prepared
in Xilinx Vivado. Subsequently, for verification of multi-party operation, a 3×party
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Table 4.1: AWS Implementation Result Analysis
AND Cores Bits Gbps AES (millions op.)/sec
1 128 2.67 0.490
3 384 8.00 1.47
12 1536 32.0 5.89
24 3072 64.0 11.8
48 6144 128 23.5
60 7680 160 29.4
design with 1 AND per party was placed on the F1 instance FPGA. As mentioned
earlier in the chapter, this was simpler to test than a three-FPGA design, avoided
communication limitations, and provided useful information.
As each 1 party block contains more control logic than just a single MPC AND,
estimates about the maximum amount of AND blocks that can fit will be conservative.
Duplicating these groups of the 3×partis produced the results summarized in Table
4.1. As with the Arria, the number of AND modules and the 6-cycle delay were used
to determine the number of bits per clock cycle that can be processed with the FPGA.
The default AWS F1 clock rate of 125 MHz was used. Additionally, the equivalent
number of AES/sec is reported for easier comparison with the results from Araki et
al. and was estimated by dividing the number of AND/sec by the 5440 AND/AES
in the reference AES circuit model as mentioned in Section 4.1. A plot of the FPGA
utilization in Figure 4·1 shows a fairly linear relationship between number of AND
modules and utilization. Both the initial Arria and AWS results were presented in
the first publication covering this research (Wolfe et al., 2020).
4.1.3 Secondary Work with AWS
While the initial work demonstrated the potential of SS on FPGA hardware, the im-
plementation only addressed Boolean shares and not arithmetic. The next research
step focused on supporting arithmetic shares and verifying that they could be imple-
mented with the same performance as the existing Boolean ones (Patel et al., 2020).
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Figure 4·1: AWS FPGA fabric total utilization
In summary, with modification, the AND and XOR primitives were able to selectively
handle multiplication and addition operations with essentially the same resource con-
sumption and performance as the Boolean only implementation shown in Table 4.1
and Figure 4·1, that is to say, with testing on the same AWS F1 instance clocked at
125 MHz with the AND/multiplication gate taking a new input every 6 cycles and
the XOR/addition gate accepting one on every cycle.
Some additional work was able to reduce the AND/multiplication gate from 6
cycles to 4 cycles. This design was able to operate at 125 MHz but couldn’t be
pushed much further. As the eventual goal was to create a fully-pipelined primitive
that could accept a new input on each clock cycle, this wasn’t tested further, and
more effort went into reworking the design to achieve this goal. This fully-pipelined
system has since been implemented and is currently being tested with the higher-level
goal of implementing a MAC operation that could be useful for tasks like ML.
4.2 Reference Results
Briefly, we consider the secure operation metric used by the original authors (Araki,
Barak, Furukawa, Lindell, et al., 2016; Araki, Furukawa, et al., 2016) when present-
ing their test results. The use the software implementation of their Secret Sharing
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Table 4.2: Araki et al. Result Analysis
Araki et al. Results Verification
Cores AES/sec Gbps/serv. Gbps/serv. w/over. Error
1 100103± 1632 0.572 0.559 2.19%
5 530408± 7219 2.99 2.96 0.85%
10 975237± 3049 5.47 5.45 0.35%
16 1242310± 4154 6.95 6.94 0.10%
20 1324117± 3721 7.38 7.40 0.28%
protocol to perform MPC protected AES operations (Araki et al., 2017). To be clear,
the authors used the logic of the AES-128 operation as mapped to a Boolean circuit
representation in Bristol Fashion Key Expanded AES (D. Archer et al., n.d.), which
requires 5440 secure AND operations. This AES is the problem of interest and is
distinct from the PRF that is used as part of the secure MPC primitive implemented
in HDL (AES-128 is used for the hardware primitive because of the good performance
it offers).
The test described by Araki et al. is embarrassingly parallel, simultaneously
running 12800 independent secure AES computations per core in each node. The
total AES operations Araki et al. performed can be used to verify the number of
bits communicated. Runtime is obtained from the AES/sec rate and total number
of AES operations reported. When we include a reasonable overhead for TCP/IP
communication between the nodes of 2.74% (Iveson, 2013), the verified network rates
we calculate closely match the reported results with less than 2.5% error (Table 4.2).
Having confirmed the operations they used while testing, our FPGA design can be
more closely compared to the original software system by dividing the number of
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Figure 4·2: Roofline model comparing Secret Sharing performance
against data center bandwidth. We denote limitations in the Araki et
al. design and our FPGA Secret Sharing implementation, and FPGA
implementations based on Garbled Circuits.
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4.3 Analysis
The original authors (Araki, Barak, Furukawa, Lindell, et al., 2016; Araki, Furukawa,
et al., 2016) tested their SS protocol implemented in software and deployed across
three nodes with general purpose processors. In their configuration, each node had
two Xeon E5-2686 v4 processors, each offering a total of 20 cores per party. The
systems were linked in a ring with 10 Gbps network connections. Nearly saturating
the connection (7.38 Gbps of 10 Gbps) required roughly 50% of each node’s processor
time. As noted in their analysis, one of the main limitations preventing full network
saturation was due to the multiple cores causing queuing congestion at the shared
NIC. If we imagine that this queuing issue were solved, we can try to estimate what
the theoretical best output the processors are capable of. Using their reported number
of MPC AES/sec and network communication for a single core, we can scale from the
73.3% CPU usage to 100% and estimate that 1 core might be approximately capable
of about ∼130 thousand MPC AES/sec. If this were achieved, one core could saturate
a ∼0.780 Gbps network connection. Multiplying for 20 cores on each node, we can
find an estimated ideal maximum of ∼2.7 million MPC AES/sec resulting in traffic
of about ∼15.6 Gbps. This is also slightly more generous than the approximation
obtained by multiplying 7.38 Gbps obtained at ∼50% to get 14.76 Gbps.
If we consider the test results described in Section 4.1.2 and Section 4.1.3, we can
see that, even with a 6-cycle delay, the AND/multiply block as tested on AWS F1
only required 3 AND cores per party to exceed the 7.38 Gbps reported by the protocol
authors in their test. Three MPC AND modules per party also only consume ∼5%
of the fabric available on each party’s FPGA, a 10× improvement vs the 50% CPU
utilization reported. This extends further if we consider attempting to fully employ all
of the FPGA fabric. If we do so, each board (and party) could implement a maximum
of 60 AND cores, which could saturate 160 Gbps links while performing 29.4 million
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MPC AES/sec. While impressive, it is also important to recall that, as described
in Section 3.4.2, an optimized, fully-pipelined MPC AND/multiply gate (processing
128 bits at a time as ours does) can saturate 10 Gbps at just 78.13 MHz or greater.
There still remains more performance to be coaxed from the hardware design. With a
fully-pipelined module operating at the same 125 MHz frequency used for the current
tests, 200 Gbps links between parties could be saturated while consuming less than
24% of the FPGA fabric. With a slightly higher clock speed, this could be lowered
further. All of the remaining fabric leaves room for additional functions, perhaps
tying MPC primitives together in hardware.
To help visualize the peak performance that can be obtained with different plat-
forms and networks when using MPC, we created a roofline plot Figure 4·2. Rather
than continuing to use the MPC AES/sec unit that was necessary to compare to the
original work, the roofline’s Y-axis is measured in number of MPC operations per
second (MOPs). The X-axis, arithmetic intensity (AI), is designated as MOPs/bit
of data transferred over the network. We only use the AND/multiply gate for this
plot as XOR/addition doesn’t require communication. Furthermore, we assume a
fully-pipelined design where one MOP per cycle is processed. Conveniently, as each
SS gate requires one bit of communication (when correlated random numbers are
generated locally to each party), an AI of 1 is possible.
With this in mind we can consider the horizontal lines. Looking at the Xeon, we
can see that the Araki et al. design as tested on the CPU nodes should be able to
reach a theoretical maximum of 1010 MOPs as long as there is no network bound (or
overhead). If we instead consider an FPGA fully populated with MPC AND/multiply
gates, we can see that, when unbounded, it should be possible to outperform the CPU
by ∼2 orders of magnitude.
Having considered these compute capabilities, we can see that the Araki et al. test
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system should provide an almost perfect balance between network and MOPs when
utilizing their 10 Gbps interface (again, assuming that overhead can be avoided or
eliminated). However, if a larger bandwidth network is available, then their applica-
tion will be limited by computational performance and thus will not be able to fully
utilize the bandwidth available. Switching our focus back to the FPGA, we can see
that at an AI of 1, the 10 GbE, 64 GbE, and even 200 GbE network connections are
still not sufficient to keep up with the compute available. Consequently, with those
network speeds, the theoretical peak of 1012 MOPs can’t be reached.
This isn’t a cause for alarm however as there are many faster links arriving to
the data center and to FPGA hardware. Additionally, there are likely to be other
functions of interest that would be placed on an FPGA used for MPC rather than
purely AND/multiplication gates. It is quite possible to imagine a case where enough
of an FPGA is used to make full use of direct network links for MPC while other
functions deployed would communicate with the host nodes via PCIe.
To provide context with respect to GC MPC, we imagine that each garbling table
can be created in a single clock cycle. In a traditional GC MPC gate a table contains
4× hashes (SHA-1 is commonly used though not all the bits are necessarily utilized).
For our roofline, we consider the AI of Garbled Circuits to be 1/(4 × 128) = 0.002,
which, when plotted, shows that Garbled Circuits are heavily network limited due to
the low arithmetic intensity and high bandwidth requirements. In summary, there are
preferable scaling properties when using SS as opposed to GC in an ideal environment.
Between the results of our FPGA tests and of our analysis, we find that SS MPC
is competitive with GC approaches. There is also strong support for the benefits of
deploying SS MPC on FPGAs when low-latency, high-bandwidth communication is
available, such as in the data center.
Chapter 5
Cloud Deployment & Platform Analysis
5.1 Cloud Computing Course
This chapter takes a step away from the low-level implementation details. Instead,
observations derive primarily from research conducted as part of the project-based
Cloud Computing course taught by Prof. Oran Krieger and Prof. Ata Turk. While
efforts described previously focused on exploring the types of MPC protocol and the
scenarios in which they could best benefit from different types of hardware accelera-
tion, the system level design and mechanism for deployments are equally important
to eventually creating a complete MPCaaS system. The mentors for the project
group, Prof. John Liagouris and Prof. Vasiliki Kalavri, had recently cleanly imple-
mented an MPC framework they called Secrecy (Liagouris et al., 2021). By creating
a fresh implementation, they were able to keep the number of outside dependencies
to a minimum, and the underlying data transactions could be grouped into tables
of values, both of which help boost performance. The only dependencies included
using Libsodium for random value generation and MPI (specifically OpenMPI) for
communication between parties.
The goals for the student group were to prepare tools to more easily deploy the
code-base into different cloud environments on the MOC and on CloudLab and to
make improve the ability to run tests and collect data. With the ability to test
in various environments, the focus on collected data was in examining the primary
bottleneck of the selected MPC protocol in the time available. With Secrecy making
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use of a 3PC SS protocol, the inter-party MPC communication primitive was the
focus of most initial testing.
While the main objective of automation was to improve the ability to rapidly test
in different environments during the course, the tools explored and developed were
also meant to be used in ongoing work. Furthermore, automation would help to better
understand the nuances of configuring and deploying MPC in different fashions in a
data center, something which is critical to understand when developing production
MPCaaS.
The three main environments considered consisted of VMs deployed using Open-
Stack on the MOC, bare-metal nodes provisioned on CloudLab (Duplyakin et al.,
2019), and containers deployed using OpenShift on the MOC. The MOC is hosted at
the MGHPCC in Massachusetts while CloudLab consists of resources across several
data centers with some primary ones located in Utah, Wisconsin, and South Carolina.
The MPC communication primitive in Secrecy was tested using several different ap-
proaches with MPI, specifically both blocking and non-blocking (sync and async) as
well as batched data in various quantities and serialized element-by-element trans-
actions. Instrumentation of tests for the communication primitive was improved in
several fashions. Instead of relying on the original “gettimeofday()” call, the new in-
strumentation employs “clock_gettime()” using the “CLOCK_MONOTONIC” source
(absolute elapsed wall-clock time from an arbitrary point in time). This change makes
it possible to more accurately measure each portion of the operation. Additionally,
the test was parameterized to allow for automatic iteration over a range of values with
a specific step size. The results were all placed in a single CSV file for convenient
analysis. Finally, some experimentation with the Score-P utilities resulted in initial
documentation on some simple benchmarking and profiling that can be enabled when
compiling with OpenMPI. Some simple tests produced reasonable results, and this
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offers another avenue for students and researchers who are working on this in the
future. It may particularly come in useful for collecting lower-level information about
inter-party communication.
5.2 Platform Comparison
The bare-metal systems tested through CloudLab were provisioned by means of a web
interface for Emulabs (White et al., 2003). Python and geni-lib (from GENI (Berman
et al., 2014)) were used to describe the bare-metal system nodes and links desired
for various tests. These descriptions automatically generate RSpec files used by the
system to provision the hardware for the experiment as the RSpec files themselves
are more challenging to edit by hand. Using this approach, existing OS images could
also be pre-selected and loaded onto each of the systems, leaving only final package
configuration before testing.
To prepare the VMs on the MOC OpenStack instance, the web interface was
used for selecting an OS image, resources, and defining the network connections. No
configuration scripts or files were needed to reach the point of a loaded OS on each
VM, leaving final package installation and configuration.
On both CloudLab and MOC OpenStack, the first few tests were prepared by
means of manual package installation and commands. This was replaced by a series
of shell scripts. Eventually, in order to better automate all of those steps and achieve a
consistent result, Ansible playbooks were developed to ensure full system preparation
of running tests. Playbooks were also used to initiate the MPC transaction tests and
retrieve data for examination.
Ansible is an agentless tool that only requires the configuring/managing system
and client systems to have Python installed. Connections between managing and
client systems are temporary and typically conducted over SSH. With few dependen-
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cies, this approach is lightweight and is consequently relatively easy to use. When
carefully crafted, the automation actions described in a playbook make it possible
to reach a consistent system state. Not only does Ansible make it possible to write
playbooks that reach specific states, but it is also possible to craft them so that a
playbook is idempotent. Then, a playbook can be utilized to verify that the desired
state is reached as multiple executions will not cause any already correct state to be
modified. The containers deployed on MOC OpenShift are also possible to automate
using Ansible but differed sufficiently from the bare-metal systems and VMs that
extended testing and development of a playbook for them was not possible during
the group project timeline.
5.2.1 Bare Metal, Virtual Machines, Containers
Ideally, the team sought to deploy bare-metal, VMs, and containers onto CloudLab
in order to make a direct comparison of the relative overhead cost of the approaches
when run with the same underlying resources. This was overly ambitious given the
limited time but remains a direction for ongoing research. Instead, some preliminary
results were captured when running the same tests across the MOC and CloudLab.
The results that the project mentors found when testing on the MOC (Liagouris et
al., 2021) were closely matched by the VMs configured by the student team, which
provided some assurance that there were not any major unexpected changes or vari-
ations. Essentially, batching inter-party data and allowing OpenMPI to determine if
and how to fragment that into multiple packets produced a faster transaction time
than serializing the operations into a sequence of individual MPI transactions (forcing
small, immediate packets).
Additionally, the tests performed on the bare-metal nodes on CloudLab were faster
than the same tests conducted on VMs on the MOC OpenStack. This result isn’t
surprising given some amount of additional overhead expected for the VMs, but with-
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out a test on the same hardware, it isn’t possible to indicate exactly how much was
lost as a result of the virtualization. Additionally, the bare-metal nodes using an x86
architecture had slightly better performance than the equivalent ARM nodes avail-
able, but it isn’t possible to attribute this to either architecture and would require
additional testing to properly examine.
While full testing was not possible, the automation efforts were eye opening and
did provide some insight and ideas for what might work best when designing a com-
plete MPCaaS.
5.2.2 Scalability & Automated Provisioning
Moving forward, a set of bare-metal nodes seems ideal for an initial deployment of
MPC parties. Using such an approach makes it much easier to logically separate
entities and makes it possible for each compute party to establish trusted control
over the system they would use to evaluate an MPC problem. This does not address
all risks; there must still be careful consideration of how to manage system firmware
and provide the necessary integrity guarantees between users. There are, however,
existing researchers working on this problem (Mosayyebzadeh et al., 2019).
Additionally, there are performance advantages in reducing the number of layers
of abstraction layered on top of hardware. While this does mean that a server could
not be shared between multiple different compute parties, this may not be too much
of a draw-back. If FPGAs are used for accelerated MPC, then the host system is
critical for each of the compute parties to configure and operate a connected FPGA
in a trusted fashion. While there would be less of a demand for the host processor to
perform MPC, there are still a number of essential steps that require it including to
coordinate with users to ingest data shares, coordinate execution of the desired MPC
operations, distribute the final result, and perform eventual system cleanup. Careful
sizing of the processor may help to complete all of these tasks while cutting idle time.
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Beyond the tools available through CloudLab, there are a number of other ways
(Ellis, 2020) to provision bare-metal clouds including OpenStack Ironic. It is possible
to envision one of these bare-metal systems being used by a data center to provision
hardware for several different compute parties with one host processor and one FPGA
each. A common set of Ansible or other setup scripts can enable each party to
inspect the operations on their own to establish trust and then to execute them
on the hardware they have been provisioned. This allows them to reach the same
configuration state as their peers. Using such an approach will also make deployment
and setup more natural for system administrators.
5.3 Key Ideas
While a cloud deployment was already envisioned while working on the low-level
hardware implementation, the vision lacked some clarity prior to the hands-on work
experience from the cloud project. Having worked with multiple different deployment
environments has made bare-metal nodes appear a better choice for MPCaaS, at least
initially. In addition to offering at least some additional performance by avoiding the
overhead of virtualization, the tools and infrastructure for provisioning and configur-
ing such systems were relatively easy to use. It was also relatively easy to configure
access for different users for each of the nodes and to imagine how one might isolate
the nodes and hand off control to independent parties. Working with Ansible also
showed that it and similar tools could provide an easy mechanism for having multiple
different MPC parties operate the same protocol while still having the freedom to
inspect all the configuration steps on their own based on their level of trust. It is also
encouraging to have had several conversations with students who are continuing the
work on Secrecy and are at the very least referring to the tools and documentation
from this work and potentially modifying and using them.
Chapter 6
Remaining Work & Conclusion
6.1 Steps to MPCaaS
At this point we have considered the goals of MPC and the different types of protocols
that exist under that name. The history of technological advances highlights the vast
improvement and specialization in processing architectures, increases in communica-
tion performance, and greater capacity of storage. The opportunity and ability to
collect, process, and benefit from “big data” both resulted from, and further spurred,
some of these innovations. In particular, the clustering of compute into larger data
centers and the cloud model of providing access to different resources goes hand-in-
hand with “big data.”
With all of these changes have come greater challenges to security and privacy.
While the problem has been recognized, it remains challenging to handle adequately.
Luckily, at this point MPC is feasible to implement and promises to be another
innovation that could help to address the issue. By making use of the algorithmic,
architectural, and operational opportunities in computing, MPCaaS can become an
easy-to-use reality for many users who are not experts in cryptography or computer
hardware. We have a plan consisting of three steps, described in the following sub-
sections, that can be followed to achieve this vision.
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6.1.1 MPC in the Cloud
In order to enable MPC in the cloud, we need to select which kind of protocol to use.
Performing well across geographically separated parties is an important consideration,
especially with high-latency connections, but is not our main focus. As shown earlier,
we seek to support cases where hardware is co-located and can be assigned to different
users in order to support multiple computations one after the other. Determining
what protocol best fits this scenario is crucial, and our work leads us to believe that
SS fits this model best. Also critical is choosing an appropriate cloud deployment
model that can provide the necessary security guarantees. While actually getting
a working MPC system into the cloud does not require the greatest performance
initially, keeping acceleration in mind when planning is important as a production
system will need to minimize the gap between MPC and non-MPC services.
Bare metal clouds may provide the system isolation needed between parties. Users
will likely need some mechanism to gain a trusted foothold in a shared data center.
Incorporating existing work, e.g., on elements such as Hardware Isolation Layer (HIL)
(Mosayyebzadeh et al., 2019) and isolated networks through VLANs, will be crucial to
deliver a system that does not require a user to handle all those considerations on their
own. Offering the deployment and management tools and selection of appropriate
MPC protocol would help system architects and administrators adopt such a system.
An administrative portal for easy configuration would be ideal.
6.1.2 Transparent Hardware
The next stage of work focuses on the interface between an MPC software library
and the FPGA hardware implementation of MPC primitives. The end goal is for
users, such as data scientists, with sufficient MPC knowledge to use the API offered
by an MPC library to benefit from hardware accelerations without needing to also
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be knowledgeable about hardware design or HDLs. In order to deliver this vision,
an MPC library that offers both sufficient features and a relatively simple interface
needs to be identified. Alternately, a new library could be developed. In the interest
of being able to offer some working system, it may also make sense to reduce the
scope of supported applications to focus more development effort on a limited set of
operations to map to hardware. One idea is to concentrate on ML applications rather
than being fully general. There has already been research seeking to support ML on
MPC (Du & Atallah, 2001; Knott et al., 2020; Ohrimenko et al., 2016; Zhao et al.,
2019). One good parallel for this vision is the manner in which PyTorch (Paszke et
al., 2019) and other tools are able to make the use of GPUs transparent to their users
while still accelerating training and inference. Researchers at Facebook also appear
to be moving in this direction as evidenced by the work on CrypTen, which seeks
to provide a software tool that enables PyTorch-style use of MPC with ML (Knott
et al., 2020).
6.1.3 Transparent MPC Functions & Program Conversion
The final stage is at the highest notional level. Here the goal is to take a working
MPC platform that employs hardware acceleration and make it usable even to those
who do not have experience with MPC. This tool should offer a mechanism to convert
programs into an MPC format automatically, which can then be mapped and deployed
on cloud-based FPGA hardware. If the choice is made to support a limited set
of applications, such as ML, then it might be possible to select an input format,
such as a PyTorch model, familiar to the end-user. This would limit the types of
MPC interactions that need to be supported and would make it possible to map key
communication stages from a clear protocol to an encrypted one. As ML use has been
growing, providing the ability to train and infer under MPC could open up more pools
of data for use by scientists.
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6.2 Current & Future Work
Ongoing work has resulted in improving the AND/multiplication hardware imple-
mentation such that it is fully pipelined. This has included doubling the number of
internal AES cores that are used as PRF increasing resource use. The ability to start
a new operation on each cycle is worth this extra cost. Furthermore, there remains a
number of additional optimizations that can be used to reduce the size of this block.
The most interesting use of this fully pipelined operation is in seeking to enable the
efficient execution of MM and MAC operations, which are critical for ML and other
applications. We plan to perform additional testing with the improved MPC prim-
itives and refine them. Additionally, ever since work started on implementing the
Araki et al. protocol, we have had the goal of eventually supporting a maliciously
secure version of the protocol. While simply using the extension of the semi-honest
protocol (Araki et al., 2017) originally seemed like the best course of action, several
four-party maliciously secure protocols have been discussed in recent literature and
may offer more efficient approaches to achieve this security objective.
We are also currently working with a few testbeds that offer multiple, directly-
linked FPGA resources. As AWS F1 does not appear likely to support serial ring
communication in the near future, we hope some of these other efforts will allow us
to test a design that is closer to a production MPCaaS. Depending on the rate of
progress, there may also be a chance to start considering some of the automation
techniques used when testing Secrecy.
More broadly, we aim to follow the steps described for achieving MPCaaS. This
may include further work on the MOC if the hardware versions for MPC on indepen-
dent nodes with FPGAs do not progress rapidly enough. Then, those lessons learned
and hardware implementation (potentially deployed to the OCT) could directly lead
to the second step. The final stage could likely be explored at a high level, perhaps
70
looking at conversions of ML to MPC problem descriptions. CrypTen is a potentially
useful project from which we can draw inspiration.
6.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, in this thesis we describe, implement, and analyze the MPC protocol
described by Araki et al. (Araki et al., 2017) in hardware. We demonstrate the
viability of Secret Sharing MPC in a low latency environment and test the design on an
FPGA in the cloud, highlighting greater potential scalability of the design compared
to alternatives (both algorithmic and architectural). With these insights, we are
actively improving our design to increase the performance further while targeting the
steps we have laid out for achieving a complete MPC cloud service. This is an exciting
time for MPC techniques, hardware acceleration, and the cloud. Hopefully this work
can encourage further efforts accelerating MPC and can lead to some new widespread
and easy-to-use security and privacy tools.
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